

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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82-4181

NSC Review Completed.

January 21, 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group Meeting

The President will chair a meeting of the National Security Planning Group on Friday, January 22, 1982, at 9:30 a.m. in the Situation Room of the White House.

Papers for the one agenda item -- Cuba -- are attached.

Principals only should plan to attend this meeting.


William P. Clark

Attachment

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Review on January 21, 1988

6-2230

SECRET/SENSITIVERESPONDING TO FLOGGERS IN CUBAEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The arrival of eight Flogger crates in Cuba is the first shipment since 12 Flogger fighter aircraft were delivered in 1978. Renewed Soviet shipment of Flogger fighter aircraft to Cuba is a serious act in and of itself. It also is representative of a Cuban military buildup which is increasingly threatening our interests. We must respond on both accounts. The attached paper seeks the President's approval of a series of political, economic, and military measures which take account of the Flogger issue in the context of our broader strategy to counter Cuban interventionism and to meet the global challenge posed by the Soviets and their proxies.

Although the Floggers appear to fall into a "gray area" of the 1962 US-Soviet Understandings on Cuba, continued Soviet modernization of the Cuban air force with aircraft such as Flogger seriously undermines the value of the 1962 Understandings to us.

A Cuban Air Force composed of modern aircraft such as Flogger could threaten targets in the Southeastern United States and Central America. Apparent US acquiescence in Flogger deliveries could open the door to further Soviet qualitative improvements in Cuban military capabilities (e.g., modern submarines, amphibious forces). Finally, a US failure to respond to this purposeful Soviet act could be misread--by regional states and by the Soviets themselves--as American reluctance to counter challenges posed by the Soviets and their proxies.

In sum, this Cuban military buildup already represents a substantial threat to US interests in the area and, if unchecked, would provide the Cubans with an unacceptable military capability to complicate our crisis management across the board. It could also lead to the Cubanization of Central America and directly threaten the Panama Canal. Thus, we must take actions to try to arrest Cuba's military modernization, not least because if we eventually have to go to the source, each additional Soviet arms shipment to Cuba will make that definitive action on our part ever more costly in US blood and treasure.

We want to respond to renewed Soviet deliveries of Floggers to Cuba -- and to the broader Cuban military threat they represent -- in a manner which will contribute to our longer-term efforts to counter Cuban intervention in the region and

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